We develop a methodology to study how uncertainty about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty a¤ects economic decision making and welfare. As an example of the power of our framework, we analytically solve and simulate household decisions and welfare in a setting in which households don't know how or when Social Security is going to be reformed. Uncertainty about the timing and structure of Social Security reform is highly regressive: the very low income group from the 2013 Trustees Report (who earn 25 percent of the economy-wide average wage) experience a welfare loss that is about 3 times larger than those who earn the maximum taxable amount in each year of their career.
Introduction
How does uncertainty about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty a¤ect economic decision making and welfare? Some researchers have considered the implications of uncertainty that is resolved at di¤erent time horizons, but the timing of the resolution of uncertainty is typically known in advance. 1 We are interested in situations in which decision makers not only face uncertainty about the outcome of a future event, but the timing of that event is also uncertain. 2 We use the term structural uncertainty to describe uncertainty over the outcome of a future event, and we use the term timing uncertainty to describe uncertainty about the timing of that future event. For example, uncertainty about Social Security reform has both a structural component and a timing component. Young Americans who must make consumption and saving plans for retirement don't know how or when Social Security will be reformed.
We develop a dynamic setting to study decision making in the face of both structural and timing uncertainty. Our setting has three main features:
First, with two layers of uncertainty instead of just one, our analysis di¤ers from a related literature that seeks to understand how the timing of the resolution of uncertainty a¤ects decision making. Rather than modeling timing uncertainty, this literature focuses on understanding how early versus late resolution of uncertainty a¤ects decision making. In each case, the timing of the resolution of uncertainty is known in advance.
3 1 Long-run risk models are an example. Epstein et al. (2014) provide an overview of this literature and they compute the "timing premium"under recursive preferences, which is the amount households would be willing to pay to resolve uncertainty about future consumption right away. But there is no timing uncertainty in their setting.
Households always know in advance whether they are living in the early-resolution world or the late-resolution world, and then the experiment is to calculate how much households in the second world would pay to live in the …rst. 2 Such situations arise naturally throughout economics, in the areas of policy uncertainty, sudden stops, regime switches, and more.
3 Blundell and Stoker (1999) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2005) study the connection between optimal consumption and the timing of income risk. They compare the case in which income risk gets resolved early to the case in which income risk gets resolved late, but in each case the household knows when the income risk gets resolved. Likewise, Wright et al. (2014) extend these ideas to …rm investment behavior. They seek to understand the di¤erential e¤ects of long and short term uncertainty on …rm investment policy, but …rms in their model don't face uncertainty about when this uncertainty gets resolved.
Second, we allow for any distribution over the resolution of timing uncertainty. This allows the framework to handle non-stationary distributions of the timing of events, which contrasts with the standard stochastic dynamic programming setting in which uncertainty is represented as a Markov process and hence is stationary and depends only on the state. Our methodology is ‡exible enough to not only handle the Markovian case in which the distribution over a shock date is time invariant but also the case in which such a distribution is a function of the date itself. For instance, it may be that one can characterize uncertainty about the timing of Social Security reform as a state dependent process, but it is convenient to specify the distribution of reform dates as a function of time itself. This allows us to quickly consider a wide variety of distributions without having to reconsider the appropriate state space. 4 We do this by combining and generalizing existing tools from the two-stage optimal control literature that deal independently with either structural uncertainty or with timing uncertainty but not both at once.
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Third, our analysis is set in a rich enough environment to obtain quantitative answers to important policy questions. We assume time is continuous because we want decision makers in our setting to face structural uncertainty that can strike at any moment, as in the case of Social Security reform.
To show the power of this framework, we tackle the important policy example that we have alluded to already. It is well known that the Social Security Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program faces severe long run solvency concerns. The 2013 Social Security 4 We are interested in a variety of possible distributions, such as the stationary case with a constant hazard rate of reform, the non-stationary case with a spike in the likelihood of reform near the date at which the trust fund is projected to run out of money, and the non-stationary case in which the likelihood of reform increases with each passing day. 5 Examples of two-stage control problems with a stochastic regime switch date (timing uncertainty) can be found in the early studies on resource extraction (Dasgupta and Heal (1974) ), operations research (Kamien and Schwartz (1971) ), and environmental catastrophe (Clarke and Reed (1994) ). And examples of problems with uncertainty about the characteristics of the new regime (structural uncertainty) appeared in the early resource extraction literature (Hoel (1978) ) and later in the technology adoption literature (Hugonnier et al. (2006) , Pommeret and Schubert (2009) , Abel and Eberly (2012) ). Our theoretical contribution is to build a bridge between these literatures by generalizing these speci…c examples and summarizing how to nest both layers of uncertainty together in a single control problem.
Trustees Report projects that the program's trust fund will run out of money in the year 2033. 6 This means that over the coming decades either promised retirement bene…ts must be cut or the payroll taxes used to fund them must be increased to keep the program solvent. Gokhale (2013) estimates that an immediate tax increase of 3.1% of taxable wages, or an immediate bene…t cut of 21%, will keep the OASI part of the program (which we focus on in this paper) solvent for the in…nite horizon.
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While there is very little uncertainty about the need for reform, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding its timing and structure (Sargent (2005) ). And even though the feasibility/optimality of various Social Security reforms have been widely studied in macroeconomic models (e.g., McGrattan and Prescott (2014) and Kitao (2014) and the references therein), relatively little attention has been paid to the microeconomic welfare consequences of uncertainty surrounding the timing and structure of reform. The macroeconomics literature treats the timing and structure of reform as part of the household information set, which allows researchers to study the e¤ects of particular reforms in general equilibrium, while we are interested in the separate issue of measuring welfare losses for households making decisions in an environment where general equilibria cannot be constructed because the timing and structure of reform are unknown.
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We use our method to characterize and simulate household consumption/saving decisions and welfare under uncertainty about the structure and timing of Social Security reform. We parameterize the model to match individual wage and survival pro…les. The parameterized model allows us to assess the welfare cost of uncertainty surrounding the timing and structure of Social Security reform. We measure this cost as the fraction of lifetime consumption that a young individual facing reform uncertainty over the life cycle would be willing to give up to live in a separate world with no reform uncertainty and with endowed wealth that is equal to expected wealth over all 6 Throughout the paper we refer to the 2013 Trustees Report because the 2014 Trustees Report doesn't have replacement rates for hypothetical earners or the estimated bene…t cut required to balance the long-term budget. 7 If the disability component of the program is also included, then the required tax increase (assuming no behavioral response) is 4% and the required bene…t cut is 23.9% as estimated in the 2013 Trustees Report. 8 While Bütler (1999) studies a particular example of the implications of uncertainty about both the timing and structure of social security reform in Switzerland, our methodology allows us to handle any assumptions about the distributions of both structural and timing uncertainty. This ‡exibility allows us to study timing and structural uncertainty in a general way and to explore the distributional e¤ects of reform in the US.
possible dates and structures of reform. Endowing the individual in the no-uncertainty world in this manner acts to net out changes in wealth that come from reform itself, leaving just the pure cost of uncertainty about reform.
9
Because Social Security bene…ts and taxes vary with income, the impact of Social Security reform uncertainty may vary across income groups. To be more speci…c, Social Security is …nanced by a proportional payroll tax up to a taxable maximum wage ($113,700 in 2013) . 10 But bene…ts are paid according to a progressive formula that gives individuals with low lifetime earnings higher replacement rates (bene…ts as a share of average lifetime earnings). Since all individuals face the same tax rate (at least up through the taxable maximum income), but receive di¤erent replacement rates, we can vary the replacement rate in our model to simulate the e¤ect of Social Security reform uncertainty for individuals of di¤erent incomes.
Uncertainty about the timing of reform is considered …rst because timing uncertainty is harder to deal with theoretically and because less is known about its welfare consequences. In this scenario, the individual has full information about the structure of reform and we consider the possibility of either a known bene…t cut or a known tax increase occurring at an unknown date.
Uncertainty about the timing of reform has moderate costs to individuals of average income, a result which holds regardless of whether reform takes the form of across-the-board tax increases or across-the-board bene…t cuts. However, tax increases and bene…t cuts have di¤erent e¤ects for low-income and high-income individuals. If individuals know that the Social Security budget will 9 Bütler (1999) also attempts to compute the welfare losses from uncertainty about the timing of social security reform. However, she compares the welfare of individuals who must live with timing uncertainty to individuals who live in a separate world with no timing uncertainty and with reform that is guaranteed to happen at the date that is mathematically expected in the …rst world. While such a comparison would certainly capture important di¤erences in behavior, it does not actually pin down the cost of uncertainty. Instead, it confounds changes in wealth with the e¤ects of uncertainty. In fact, with such a comparison it is theoretically possible to come to the mistaken conclusion that uncertainty actually is a good thing (because it increases an individual's expected lifetime wealth). For instance, if we assume that individuals in the …rst world are uncertain about when a bene…t cut will strike and the mathematical expectation is that it will strike just before retirement, then individuals would want maximum variance around this expectation in order to create the possibility of collecting full bene…ts for at least some portion of the retirement period. 10 The taxable maximum is $118,500 in 2015, but again we focus on 2013 values throughout the paper because the 2013 Trustees Report is more comprehensive.
be balanced using an across-the-board bene…t cut, uncertainty about the timing of reform harms low-income individuals more because Social Security accounts for a larger portion of their lifetime wealth. Alternatively, when the budget will be balanced using an across-the-board tax increase, high-income individuals earning the taxable maximum face larger welfare losses because they face the same percentage tax increase but rely less on the progressive bene…t.
In addition to timing uncertainty, individuals also do not know the structure of future reform.
The government may balance the budget through tax increases, bene…t cuts, or some combination of the two. After adding this second layer of uncertainty to our model, the overall welfare cost of the combined reform uncertainty can be greater or less than the cost for the case where there is only timing uncertainty. However, we …nd that this double uncertainty consistently imposes much larger welfare costs on low-income individuals across all parameterizations of the model.
The very low income group from the 2013 Trustees Report (who earn 25 percent of the economywide average wage) experience a welfare loss that is about 3 times larger than those who earn the maximum taxable amount in each year of their career.
This paper is related to Gomes et al. (2007) , Benítez-Silva et al. (2007) and Luttmer and Samwick (2012) who also attempt to quantify the costs of Social Security reform uncertainty. Gomes et al. (2007) study a model environment in which there is uncertainty about whether a bene…t cut will occur at a given future date. Their baseline household would be willing to give up 0.12% of annual consumption in exchange for learning about the cut to Social Security bene…ts at age 35 instead of age 65. While this result has a similar ‡avor to ours, their model likely overstates the result by placing the uncertainty at the worst possible date (i.e., at retirement) rather than modeling the full uncertainty about the timing of reform. Moreover, it is important to note that their welfare calculation-how much households would pay to resolve uncertainty earlier rather than right at retirement-does not capture how households behave in the face of timing uncertainty. Households in their model never actually face timing uncertainty because the date at which information is released to the public is known in advance.
11;12
11 Gomes et al. (2007) also consider the gains from early resolution of uncertainty about the magnitude of a future tax increase. But once again households know in advance the future date at which the government will release the information, so there is no timing uncertainty in their model. 12 Evans et al. (2012) consider a model in which future transfers to the old are uncertain because transfers are Similar to Gomes et al. (2007) , Benítez-Silva et al. (2007) Finally, we depart from a literature that assumes that individuals don't fully understand the rules and incentives of Social Security taxation and bene…t calculations. In that literature, individuals have incomplete information because information is costly to acquire or because they lack the ability to process information, while the political process is stationary and the rules are knowable (see Liebman and Luttmer (2014) for additional discussion). In contrast, in our setting individuals are fully rational and have full information about everything that is knowable, which includes the distributions of random variables relating to political risks, while the realization of these random variables is unknowable. This implies that our estimates of the cost of uncertainty about Social Security reform are likely a lower bound.
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based on the stochastic wages of the young. If promised transfers are infeasible because of a negative productivity shock, the government switches to a more a¤ordable transfer scheme. Households anticipate this risk, which in turn a¤ects the equity premium. Likewise, van der Wiel (2008) considers the e¤ect of uncertainty about future Social Security bene…ts on private savings, but similar to Gomes et al. (2007) , the individual knows in advance that the government will announce the new level of bene…ts at the date of retirement, so there is no timing uncertainty. 13 Our paper is related to the growing literature on policy uncertainty more generally. Uncertainty about future policy can a¤ect investment, saving, and hiring decisions (Rodrik (1989 ), Bernanke (1983 ). The impact of policy uncertainty on …rms' decisions and pro…tability can be substantial, potentially resulting in large e¢ ciency costs.
Several of these studies estimate or calibrate models in which taxes, government spending, or other policies are uncertain, and then explore the economic impacts of this uncertainty (Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , Croce et al. (2012) , Hassett and Metcalf (1999) , Pastor and Veronesi (2011), Sialm (2006) , Ulrich (2012) ). Others use the timing of national elections as a measure of policy uncertainty, examining the impact of uncertain election outcomes on economic behavior (Belo et al. (2011 ), Boutchkova et al. (2012 , Durnev (2010) , Julio and Yook (2012), Pantzalis et al. (2000) ).
Theory: Dynamic Problems with Timing Uncertainty and Structural

Uncertainty
In this section we provide a self contained summary of how to solve a generic dynamic problem that features both timing uncertainty and structural uncertainty. Problem 1 features timing uncertainty only. And Problem 2 features both timing uncertainty and structural uncertainty.
14 Time is continuous and indexed by t. Time starts at t = 0 and never ends. The planning interval of the decision maker, which begins at t = 0 and ends at t = T , is comprised of two regimes or stages. The …rst stage stretches from t = 0 to t = t 1 , and the second stage stretches from t = t 1 to t = T . Each stage has a unique performance index and/or a unique state equation.
The regime switch date t 1 is a continuous random variable, with probability density (t 1 ) and sample space [0; 1]. The control variable u(t) is unconstrained and the state variable x(t) is constrained only at the initial and terminal points in time.
Problem 1 (Timing Uncertainty Only).
t 1 random with density (t 1 ) and sample space [0; 1].
14 Our analysis builds on the two-stage control literature in which the switch date is deterministic and may be a choice variable or exogenous (Kemp and Long (1977) , Tomiyama (1985) , Amit (1986), Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) It is helpful to lay out some assumptions and de…nitions before stating the necessary conditions.
Assumption 1 (Di¤erentiability). The functions f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and (t 1 ) are continuously di¤erentiable in their arguments.
;T ] be the optimal control and state path for any t after the realization of the random regime switch, conditional on the switch date t 1 and conditional on the stock of the state variable at that switch date x(t 1 ).
Similarly, let (u 1 (t); x 1 (t)) t2[0;T ] be the optimal control and state path for any t before the realization of the random switch. Hence, the path that is actually followed, conditional on switch
Theorem 1 (Necessary Conditions to Problem 1). The necessary conditions can be derived recursively in two steps.
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Step 1. Solve the post-switch (t = t 1 ) subproblem:
Given the Hamiltonian function
the necessary conditions that must hold on the path (u 2 (tjt 1 ; x(t 1 )); x 2 (tjt 1 ; x(t 1 ))) t2[t 1 ;T ] include @H 2 =@u(t) = 0 and d 2 (t)=dt = @H 2 =@x(t). For convenience, change the time dummy t to z, and change the switch point t 1 to t and write the solution (u 2 (zjt; x(t)); x 2 (zjt; x(t))) z2[t;T ] . Thus we have the optimal control and state paths for all points in time z greater than switch point t.
Step 2. Solve the pre-switch (t = 0) subproblem:
The program (u 1 (t); x 1 (t)) t2[0;T ] solves a …xed endpoint Pontryagin subproblem with continuation function S(t; x(t)):
subject to
the necessary conditions that must hold on the path (u 1 (t);
Corollary 1 (Su¢ ciency). If g 1 and g 2 are linear in u(t) and x(t) and the integrands of J 1 and J 2 are concave in u(t) and x(t), then the necessary conditions are su¢ cient (Mangasarian (1966) ).
Checking the concavity of the integrand of J 2 is standard. But checking the concavity of the integrand of J 1 is more involved. This is because the integrand of J 1 depends on the optimal postswitch path. Thus, one must …rst derive the post-switch solution (u 2 (zjt; x(t)); x 2 (zjt; x(t))) z2[t;T ] , which depends on x(t), and then insert this solution into S before checking the concavity of the integrand of J 1 .
Finally, to conclude this section we note that in addition to stochastic timing of the regime switch, we can easily allow for the possibility that the structure of the new regime itself (the functional form of the post-switch state equation) is uncertain. Adding in this second layer of uncertainty is relatively easy and requires just a few adjustments to Problem 1 and Theorem 1.
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Problem 2 (Timing Uncertainty and Structural Uncertainty). Add the following to Problem 1: the uncertainty about the functional form of g 2 is summarized by the random variable , with density ( ) and sample space normalized to [0; 1], where ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable and realizations of and t 1 are uncorrelated.
Theorem 2 (Necessary Conditions to Problem 2).
Follow Theorem 1 to recursively derive necessary conditions with the following slight modi…cations: in Step 1 use the notation g 2 (t; u(t); x(t)j ) and (u 2 (tjt 1 ; x(t 1 ); ); x 2 (tjt 1 ; x(t 1 ); )) t2[t 1 ;T ] to emphasize dependence of the solution on the realization of , and in
Step 2 write the continuation function S(t; x(t); ) and replace the last term in the integrand of J 1 with R 1 0 ( ) (t)S(t; x(t); )d .
Application: Uncertainty about the Timing of Reform
Notation
Age is continuous and is indexed by t. Households are born at t = 0 and pass away no later than t = T . The probability of surviving to age t is (t). Retirement and bene…t collection occur 16 Models with uncertainty about the structure of the new regime appeared in the early resource extraction literature (Hoel (1978) ) and then again in the more modern literature on technology adoption when future returns to technology are stochastic (Hugonnier et al. (2006) , Schubert (2009), Abel and Eberly (2012) ).
Problem 2 and Theorem 2 show how to augment our previous control problem to include both layers of uncertainty.
exogenously at t = t R and labor is supplied inelastically. 17 A given household collects wages at rate w(t) during the working period.
The government's current policy is summarized by a tax rate on wage earnings and bene…t annuity ( 1 ; b 1 ). The current policy is unsustainable and this is publicly known. Therefore households know that reform is coming, but they don't know when. The reform date t 1 is a random variable with probability density (t 1 ) and sample space [0; 1].
The post-reform policy is ( 2 ; b 2 ). For now, we assume households have full information about the nature of the reform ( 2 ; b 2 ), they just don't know when it will kick in. Thus we are dealing with an application of Problem 1 from the previous section and Theorem 1 applies. Later we will consider an application of Problem 2, where both the timing and structure of reform are uncertain.
To compress notation let y 1 (t) be disposable income before the reform and let y 2 (t) be disposable income after the reform,
Consumption is c(t) and savings is k(t), which earns interest at rate r.
Household Problem
Period utility is CRRA with relative risk aversion , and utils are discounted at the rate of time preference . The household solves a dynamic stochastic control problem, taking as given the disposable income functions y 1 (t) and y 2 (t) while treating the reform date t 1 as a random variable:
17 Fixing the retirement and collection dates allows us to parameterize the model to empirically reasonable values for these choices while abstracting from natural and institutional complications that shape the incentives behind these choices, such as declining worker productivity with age, disability risk, the delayed retirement credit, the taxation of social security bene…ts, and the ability of individuals to claim bene…ts before or after retirement. subject to
We refer readers to Appendix B for a step-by-step derivation of the solution to this problem.
Here we report just the end results. Using Theorem 1 as our guide, we solve this problem recursively: following
Step 1 we …nd that the post-reform (after the shock has hit) consumption path
Note the dependence on the timing of the reform and on the stock of assets at the time of reform.
Then, following
Step 2 and using the post-reform solution and working backwards, we …nd that the pre-reform solution (c 1 (t); k 1 (t)) t2[0;T ] solves the following system of di¤erential equations and boundary conditions
Finally, once we have the stage-one solution (c 1 (t); k 1 (t)) t2[0;T ] , we can use it to obtain the explicit stage-two solution conditional on realization of reform date t 1 ,
Welfare
As a point of reference, consider the case where the individual faces no risk (NR) about future taxes and bene…ts. The individual is endowed at t = 0 with expected future income and solves
where
The solution is
The welfare cost of living with reform uncertainty is the solution to the following equation
Notice that captures just the cost of uncertainty about reform, and not the cost of reform itself. It is the fraction of consumption that the individual would be willing to give up to live in a world with no timing uncertainty. By endowing the individual with expected wealth over all possible reform dates we are netting out the lost wealth that comes form reform itself, leaving only the cost of uncertainty about reform. In other words, if at date t = 0 the government were to announce a future reform date t 1 , then = 0. 
Parameterization
The model is parameterized to capture individual income levels and survival probabilities over the life cycle. The parameters to be chosen are the maximum lifespan T , the survival function (t), the exogenous retirement date t R , the real return on assets r, the individual discount rate , the utility preference parameter governing risk aversion , the age-earnings distribution w(t), the probability density over reform dates (t 1 ), and policy parameters capturing tax rates and bene…t levels before and after reform f 1 ; 2 ; b 1 ; b 2 g.
Our survival data come from the Social Security Administration's cohort mortality tables.
These tables contain the mortality assumptions underlying the intermediate projections in the 2013 Trustees Report. The mortality table for each cohort provides the number of survivors at each age f1; 2; :::; 119g, starting with a cohort of 10,000 newborns. However, we truncate the mortality data at age 100, assuming that everyone who survives to age 99 dies within the next year. We assume individuals enter the labor market at age 25, giving them a 75-year potential lifespan within the model. In our baseline parameterization, we use the mortality pro…le for males born in 1990, who are assumed to enter the labor market in 2015. For this cohort, we construct the survival probabilities at all subsequent ages conditional on surviving to age 25.
We normalize time so that the maximum age in the model is T = 1. Thus t = 0 in the model corresponds to age 25, and t = 1 corresponds to age 100. Because the survival data are discrete (providing the probability of surviving to each integer age), we …t a continuous survival function models that they consider people are willing to pay for early resolution of uncertainty because of the way utility is speci…ed (Epstein-Zin), even though the early information cannot be used to reoptimize. This contrasts with our setting in which early resolution leads to welfare gains precisely because it allows for better optimization and smaller distortions to consumption/saving decisions. This distinction arises because they consider uncertainty over consumption streams whereas we consider uncertainty over income streams. If we were to use Epstein-Zin utility then presumably our timing premium would be larger because it would capture not just the distortions to consumption and saving caused by late resolution of uncertainty but it would also capture the innate desire to know one's consumption outcomes in advance. Epstein et al. (2014) remain very skeptical, however, that people would be willing to pay very much to know their consumption outcomes in advance if there is nothing that can be done to change those outcomes.
that has the following form:
After transforming the survival data to correspond to model time, with dates on [0; 1], x = 3:28 provides the best …t to the data.
The …xed retirement age is assumed to occur at age 65, which corresponds to t R = 40 75
in the model. 20 We assume a risk-free real interest rate of 2.9% per year, which is consistent with the long-run real interest rate assumed by the Social Security Trustees. In our model, this implies a value of r = 75 0:029 = 2:175. Estimates of the individual discount rate vary substantially in the literature, and values of < r are necessary to generate a hump shaped consumption pro…le in the model. In the baseline model we set = 0, although we consider other values in robustness exercises. In the baseline calibration we also set = 3, with other values considered for robustness.
We import the individual income pro…le from Gourinchas and Parker (2002) First, income data from Gourinchas and Parker (2002) is only available until age 65. Second, many individuals stop working and claim an actuarially reduced Social Security bene…t before the normal retirement age. Finally, this assumption can make our results easier to compare with previous research, as many prior studies specify a retirement age of 65. This assumption will also be important when setting replacement rates for individuals of di¤erent incomes. We will then use replacement rates corresponding to retirement at age 65, rather than normal retirement age.
respondents to rate the chances of a cut in Social Security bene…ts in general within the next 10 years. In the 2010 wave of the survey, the mean subjective probability of a bene…t cut within the next 10 years is around 65%; however, there is much variance around this value.
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We assume that reform is a Weibull random variable,
We consider two special cases, the exponential density and the Rayleigh density. First, we assume = 1 to generate a constant hazard rate of reform
Because it seems unlikely that the individual will totally escape reform, we calibrate this function by assuming 
The larger the value of , the greater the mass around 2033. Our computational procedure struggles with values of larger than 2, so we set = 2 which then implies = 0:3394. Figure 2 shows the graphs of these two calibrations of (t 1 ). We will report welfare calculations for both calibrations.
The current Social Security policy ( 1 ; b 1 ) in the model is parameterized to match the current 21 The Survey of Economic Expectations also elicits information on household expectations about future social security bene…ts (Dominitz et al. (2003) , Manski (2004) ). While this survey does document substantial uncertainty, it does not speci…cally measure uncertainty about the timing of reform. We are likely understating the costs of uncertainty because we are assuming that social security will continue to exist no matter what, whereas in reality a large portion of young households are not even con…dent of that (Dominitz et al. (2003) ).
policy in the US. Consistent with our modeling in earlier sections, we focus only on retirement insurance (the Old Age and Survivors, or OASI, program) and ignore disability insurance. The OASI payroll tax rate (combined employer and employee shares) is 1 = 10:6%. Bene…ts b 1 are chosen to match observed replacement rates for various income groups.
Social Security bene…ts are based on an individual's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), calculated as average monthly earnings, indexed for economy-wide wage growth, over the highest 35 years of the individual's career. A progressive bene…t formula is applied to AIME to arrive at an individual's Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), the monthly bene…t payable if bene…ts are claimed at normal retirement age. Claiming before normal retirement age -for example, at age 65, as we assume in our model -results in an actuarial reduction to bene…ts. The progressive bene…t formula implies that the replacement rate -the ratio of monthly bene…ts to AIME -falls with AIME.
The Social Security Trustees Report publishes replacement rates for several stylized workers, each earning a …xed multiple of the economy-wide average wage throughout their career. According to the 2013 Trustees Report, the very low income group, which earns 25% of the economy-wide average wage, receives a replacement rate of 67.5% of AIME if bene…ts are claimed at age 65. The low-income group, which earns 45% of the economy-wide average wage, has a replacement rate of 49.0% of AIME. The medium income group, which earns the economy-wide average wage, receives a replacement rate of 36.4% of AIME. The high income group, which earns 1.6 times the average wage, receives a replacement rate of 30.1% of AIME. Finally, workers who earn the maximum taxable amount in each year of their career receive a replacement rate of 24.0% of AIME. These replacement rates apply to the year 2055, when the 1990 cohort turns 65. To compute pre-reform bene…ts, b 1 , we apply these replacement rates to the AIME for the normalized life-cycle income pro…le in our model, which is 0.92927.
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For the policy experiments considered in the paper we assume that the reform undertaken will balance the Social Security budget over the in…nite horizon. 23 According to Gokhale (2013) the unfunded liabilities of the OASI program over the in…nite horizon would require a permanent tax increase of 3.1% of payroll (assuming no behavioral response to the tax increase). Alternatively, all current and future bene…ts could be cut by 21%. 24 As an initial pass, we consider both of these possible reforms:
Full bene…t cut. An across-the-board reduction in bene…ts by 21% for all current and future retirees (no exemption for current retirees) and no change in taxes. Hence, the new policy is ( 2 ; b 2 ) = ( 1 ; b 1 (1 21%)).
Full tax increase. An across-the-board increase in the OASI tax rate by 3.1 percentage points for all taxpayers regardless of age and no change in bene…ts. Hence, ( 2 ; b 2 ) =
( 1 + 3:1%; b 1 ).
We consider each of these reforms separately and assume that individuals know the reform that will occur, but they are uncertain about the timing. The results from these two scenarios will clarify the intuition of how timing uncertainty in ‡uences individual consumption and savings decisions. We will later consider the case where individuals are also uncertain about the structure of reform, not knowing if it will be a bene…t cut, a tax increase, or some combination of the two.
Results
In order to gain intuition about the e¤ects of uncertainty about the timing of reform, we plot the results for the bene…t cut and tax increase scenarios. in Kitao (2014) , the required tax increase is 6% and the required bene…t cut is 33%. Our welfare costs will go up if we feed bigger policy shocks into our model.
individual actually follows is c 1 up to the stochastic date of reform and then consumption drops down to c 2 . There is a continuum of many c 2 paths, we have simply plotted two possibilities for illustrative purposes. An important feature of the experiment to emphasize is that the individual is still subject to a bene…t cut even after the retirement date, so the …rst stage consumption path takes this possibility into account. This …gure clearly shows how uncertainty about the timing of bene…t reform causes non-trivial distortions to consumption-saving decisions. If the reform shock is realized fairly early, then consumption falls below the level without Social Security risk, whereas a later reform shock leaves consumption above the no-risk path. The trouble of course is that the individual doesn't know when the shock will hit. Figure 4 plots the same information but for the case of a tax increase, again for an individual with average earnings who faces a constant hazard rate of reform. We consider two alternative hypothetical reform dates, t 1 = 0:1 and t 1 = 0:4 just as an example. We don't plot reform dates after retirement because, even though reform may indeed strike after retirement, there is no distortion to consumption because the individual no longer pays Social Security taxes. Similar to the case of a bene…t cut, consumption always drops the moment reform strikes.
The drop in consumption in either scenario is not because the individual is taken by surprise per se, but is instead the result of rational, forward-looking behavior in the face of uncertainty.
Reconsider Figure 3 and suppose the individual is standing just to the left of t = 0:7. From this perspective, the individual knows the shock may happen at any time over the interval [0:7; 1] and therefore bases consumption on that expectation, which is rational ex ante. But if the shock hits at the next moment (i.e., at t = 0:7) then ex post the individual turns out to be a little poorer than anticipated the moment before and hence consumption must be revised down.
Our …rst set of results corresponds to the welfare loss for an individual with average earnings who faces a constant hazard rate of reform. We …nd that the magnitude of the welfare loss is moderate for this individual: 0.01% of total lifetime consumption for the case of a bene…t cut. We also …nd that uncertainty about the timing of tax reform is twice as costly as uncertainty about the timing of bene…t reform, again for an individual with average earnings who faces a constant hazard of reform. 25 This is because the exponential density puts much of the mass during the working period, so that if the individual is living in the bene…t-reform world, then he actually faces somewhat less uncertainty about his lifetime wealth because he knows there is a good chance that bene…ts will be cut before he retires anyway.
We also …nd important distributional e¤ects as we look beyond the average individual. Table 1 reports welfare losses associated with uncertainty about the timing of reform for di¤erent income levels (each relative to the average individual in the bene…t reform scenario). Due to the progressively of bene…ts, uncertainty about the timing of a bene…t cut is more harmful to low income individuals than to high income individuals. For example, Table 1 shows that, for the case of constant hazard rate of reform (Panel A), the very low income group will experience a welfare loss that is 4 times larger than what is experienced by the highest income group that maximizes their social security contribution in each year of work. This asymmetry occurs because social security bene…ts are a larger share of total retirement income for the poor than for the rich, and uncertainty over something important is naturally going to be costly. Qualitatively, this result continues to hold when we replace the exponential distribution with the Rayleigh distribution (see
Panel B).
But this distributional e¤ect reverses its sign for the case of uncertainty about the timing of a tax increase. Essentially, now the progressivity argument works in the opposite way. Even though all income groups pay the same tax rate, uncertainty about the tax rate is more costly for the rich because social security bene…ts are smaller for them (relative to their wage) and hence they face uncertainty about a larger portion of their wealth than do the poor. This result hold across both assumptions about the distribution of reform shocks. 
Double Uncertainty: Timing and Structural Uncertainty
We now assume that both the timing and structure of social security reform are uncertain. Let increase. Of course,~ 2 > 1 andb 2 < b 1 . But the new policy that the government actually chooses ( 2 ; b 2 ) is an uncertain, linear combination of these extremes. We will express the new tax policy as a function of a continuous random variable (with density ( ) and sample space [0; 1]):
and
Using Theorem 2, the post-reform consumption path is
and the pre-reform Euler equation is
Using this Euler equation, together with the law of motion and boundary conditions for the savings account, we can compute the stage-one solution (c 1 (t);
Finally, for welfare comparisons, the no risk benchmark is
e rv y 2 (vj )dv, and the welfare cost of reform uncertainty solves the following equation
In the absence of reliable data on expectations about the structure of future reform, which is ultimately a political decision that will re ‡ect the preferences of policymakers, we assume ( ) is the uniform density. Table 2 documents the welfare costs of double uncertainty for various income levels, each relative to the average earner in the full bene…t reform scenario with a constant hazard rate of reform. The main …nding of interest is that double uncertainty hurts the poor more than the rich by roughly a factor of 3, regardless of which assumption we make about the distribution of reform dates.
Figures 5 through 7 show the e¤ects of double uncertainty on consumption allocations over the life cycle. In Figure 5 we report …ve consumption pro…les: the optimal consumption path given that reform has not yet happened, c 1 ; the consumption path corresponding to a hypothetical world without reform risk, c N R ; and three post-reform consumption pro…les c 2 conditional on reform striking at date t 1 = 0:4. Note that reform may happen at any time of course. We are just showing the optimal responses for this particular date. Furthermore, there is a continuum of post-reform consumption pro…les even for a single reform date because the structure of reform, , is a continuously distributed random variable as well. For illustrative purposes however, we plot optimal responses to just three particular realizations 2 f0; 0:5; 1g, which correspond to full bene…t reform, 50-50 tax and bene…t reform, and full tax reform. Our calculations of welfare losses take into account the full distribution of , rather than just the three realization shown here, but the …gure would be too messy to show all realizations over . Figure 5 illustrates that the individual will reduce consumption if the shock turns out to be bene…t reform, whereas consumption actually jumps up a bit if the shock takes the form of a tax increase. This is because the individual was rationally planning for the contingency that bene…ts would be dramatically cut, and hence the news that reform takes the structure of a tax increase is a positive shock to expected wealth because there are only a few years of tax payments left and now bene…t are certain. To make the intuition clear, suppose at the very moment the individual retires the government announces that the Social Security program will reform its budget solely through increased taxation. This is a strictly positive wealth shock for this individual because he/she doesn't bear any of the burden of the tax increase, and now Social Security bene…ts are no longer in jeopardy. But good news should not be confused with welfare, because the uncertainty about the timing and structure of reform distort consumption and saving allocations in the years leading up to reform, even if reform just so happens to never actually end up costing the individual anything. Figure 6 plots the exact same information as Figure 5 , but for the case of a later realization of the reform shock (t 1 = 0:6 instead of 0:4). Taken together, the two …gures show similar qualititative responses to the resolution of timing and structural uncertainty. However, the individual's responses are more exaggerated in the case of the later shock, at least up to a certain age, after which there is eventually so little remaining Social Security bene…ts to collect that uncertainty about the timing and structure of reform becomes irrelevant. Figure 7 shows a little more detail. We add to Figures 5 and 6 the optimal consumption responses to a wider variety of realizations of the timing of reform, t 1 2 f0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9g, while still plotting just three particular realizations of the structure of reform 2 f0; 0:5; 1g. This …gure helps to illustrate, at a glance, a few of the many contingent consumption plans formulated by the individual, and it helps to illustrate the breath of the distortion to consumption that is caused by the presence of double uncertainty about Social Security reform. For instance, at this particular parameterization, the variation in consumption during the middle part of the retirement period is especially severe. The maximum possible consumption levels over retirement result from the cases in which full tax reform (with no bene…t cut) strikes during retirement and the individual therefore realized that he is totally o¤ the hook, while minimum possible consumption levels during the retirement period result from cases in which full bene…t reform strikes near the transition from work to retirement. 
Robustness
In this section we show how our results change when we alter certain assumptions. First, we consider di¤erent assumptions about preference parameters (the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the discount rate). Second, we show how much larger the welfare costs of uncertainty can be as we increase the variance of timing uncertainty and as we increase the variance of structural uncertainty. These are important extensions because we do not have good data to guide our baseline calibration of timing and structural uncertainty. Third, we show that the poor are still hit much harder than the rich by reform uncertainty even if we consider di¤erential mortality across income groups, which is commonly believed to unwind at least some of the progressivity of Social Security (e.g., Coronado et al. (1999) ).
Preference Parameters
As we increase the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , from the baseline value of 3 up to 5, the magnitude of the welfare cost of reform uncertainty increases dramatically. For instance, for the baseline case of exponentially distributed uncertainty about the timing of a full bene…t cut, the cost to an average earner increases by more than 50%. The same is also true for the case of exponentially distributed uncertainty about the timing of a full tax increase.
Our baseline assumption is that the individual only discounts for mortality and not for pure time preference ( = 0). If we make a slightly more standard assumption that the discount rate equals the market rate of interest ( = r = 2:9%), then the welfare e¤ects of uncertainty about reform grow stronger. For instance, for the baseline case of exponentially distributed uncertainty about the timing of a full bene…t cut, the cost of uncertainty for an average earner increases by 20%, while uncertainty about the timing of a full tax increase becomes 10% more costly to an average earner.
Uniform Reform Dates
A plausible assumption is that the random reform date is distributed uniformly over the individual's maximum lifespan, (t 1 ) = 1 for all t 1 2 [0; 1]. Such an assumption spreads out the distribution of reform shocks more than in the baseline densities. The welfare results are reported in Table 3 , holding everything else at baseline parameters and assuming the structure of reform ( ) continues to be distributed uniformly as well. Uncertainty about the timing of full bene…t reform is now much more costly than in the baseline cases, while the cost of uncertainty about the timing of full tax reform is on the same order of magnitude as the baseline cases. Double uncertainty now hits the poor almost 4 times as hard as it hits the rich. 
Extreme Political Risk
We have thus far used a uniform distribution over (the structural uncertainty parameter) in all of our calculations for the double uncertainty case. This assumption implies that any particular convex combination (compromise) between a full tax increase and a full bene…t cut is just as likely as any other combination. This may be a reasonable baseline assumption, but it could be the case that the structure of reform will ultimately look more like the outcome of a tug-of-war contest between two political parties, with one side winning completely and the other side losing, rather than a compromise. In this subsection we assume that the structure of reform is uncertain and will be either all on the tax side or all on the bene…t side, with no probability of a convex combination. We assume that these two possibilities are equally likely, and we leave everything else at the baseline parameterization.
We obtain two key results. First, extreme political risk causes the welfare costs of reform uncertainty to be signi…cantly larger than in the baseline calculations, for all income groups.
Second, extreme political risk widens the inequality in welfare costs among the rich and poor. In the baseline calculations, reform uncertainty hits the poor about 3 times harder than the rich, but in the current case it is closer to a factor of 4.
Di¤erential Mortality
It is well known that low-income individuals su¤er from lower survival probabilities at all ages relative to high-income individuals. We have recomputed our welfare analysis for the case of income-speci…c survival functions based on Social Security administrative data provided in Table   1 of Waldron (2013) . Based on this data, we assume that, throughout their lives, maximum earners face age-speci…c hazard rates of dying that are 0.5 times those of average earners, high earners face age-speci…c hazard rates that are 0.8 times those of average earners, low earners face age-speci…c hazard rates that are 1.4 times those of average earners, and very low earners face age-speci…c hazard rates that are 2.5 times those of average earners. (If scaling by these factors causes an age-speci…c hazard rate to exceed 1, that hazard rate is set to 1). Allowing hazard rates to di¤er by income group causes almost no change to our calculations of the welfare costs of uncertainty about the timing of reform.
Why doesn't di¤erential mortality undo our results? One may think that because our results are driven by the progressivity of the Social Security system, including di¤erential mortality would undo our results since this would unwind (or even reverse) the progressivity of the system. While it is true that di¤erential mortality unwinds the progressivity of Social Security in a cross-sectional sense, it does not unwind the progressivity in a longitudinal sense. At a moment in time, the ratio of aggregate bene…ts collected by survivors to aggregate taxes paid by workers would tend to be low for segments of the population with lower survival probabilities. But this has nothing to do with how a given worker treats Social Security taxes and bene…ts in an expected utility (longitudinal) model. In such a model, the progressivity of Social Security is only related to the bene…t-earning rule and not to mortality risk, because the latter enters the model only though the discount factor in the utility function. Regardless of their survival type, expected utility maximizers make an optimal consumption-saving plan that accounts for the contingency that they survive until the maximum possible date. In other words, income ‡ows (like Social Security) in the budget constraint of an expected utility maximizer are not discounted for survival risk.
Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to understand the welfare consequences of uncertainty over the timing and structure of social security reform. Household decision-making in the face of reform uncertainty can be modeled as a stochastic two-stage optimal control problem. We have formalized the tools that are required for studying this issue in a continuous-time setting.
We have paid special attention to how these welfare costs are distributed across income groups.
While the precise magnitude of the welfare costs depend on a variety of factors, a consistent theme throughout our paper is that reform uncertainty may strike low-income groups especially hard.
While the need for reform itself is driven by unavoidable demographic forces, uncertainty about the timing and structure of reform are avoidable. All of the costs that we report in this paper go away if policymakers simply announce when and how Social Security will be reformed.
and likewise
Note that the control and state variables are de…ned over the entire planning interval because the switch could happen at any time on this interval, and hence the pre-switch problem amounts to choosing a path for these variables over the full interval. The marginal valuation of the state variable re ‡ects the fact that the switch could happen at any moment in time, and hence the entire timepath of the state variable is relevant in determining the continuation value during the second stage. This makes matters more complicated than in the standard two-stage model with a deterministic switch, because there the costate variables from the two stages are simply equated at the switch point to ensure that the value of …nishing the …rst stage with an extra unit of the state variable is equal to the value of starting the second stage with another unit. Whereas here the two stages are linked together through a continuation functional. The solution to the above problem is the one that will be followed up to the random switch point.
This appears to be a non-standard control problem, but with some algebra we can convert it into a standard one for which the standard Maximum Principle applies. To make progress, let's change the dummy of integration in the second integral in J 1 from t 1 to t, and also change the dummy in the continuation functional from t to z. Now we restate the objective functional as
This innocuous change of variables is helpful because it allows us to write the continuation function S as a function of x(t). In doing so, u 2 (zjt; x(t)) and x 2 (zjt; x(t)) now take on the interpretation of the optimal control and state variables for all points in time z that are beyond the switch date t and conditional on x(t).
Changing the order of integration in the …rst term in J 1 , along with applying Fubini's Theorem to the third term in J 1 , causes a more manageable Pontryagin problem to emerge. Let us now restate our problem one last time
This reformulated objective functional has an intuitive interpretation. The …rst term in the integrand gives the payo¤ of u(t) and x(t) through the function f 1 (t; u(t); x(t)), weighted by the probability that the random switch will occur sometime after t. The second term gives the payo¤ of holding x(t) through the continuation value S(t; x(t)), weighted by the density function (t).
Thus, the …rst payo¤ term f 1 is weighted by one minus the c.d.f. because this payo¤ is relevant as long as the switch comes later than t, whereas the second payo¤ term S is weighted by the p.d.f. because this payo¤ is relevant only at the switch point. The standard Maximum Principle can be applied to this reformulated subproblem. We denote the solution to this subproblem (u 1 (t); x 1 (t)) t2 [0;T ] . This is the solution path for all t before the realization of the random switch.
Note that the switch could happen at any point in time. This is why this subproblem is de…ned over the entire planning interval.
Appendix B. Derivation of Solution to Household Problem
Using Theorem 1 as our guide, we can solve the stochastic two-stage household problem recursively by breaking it into two Pontryagin subproblems as follows.
Step 1. Solve the post-reform (t = t 1 ) subproblem:
We …rst solve the Pontryagin subproblem corresponding to the moment that reform occurs. 
This is the optimal consumption path after the reform shock has hit.
Anticipating the method for solving the pre-reform subproblem in the next step of Theorem 1, we will need to change the time dummies: now think of t as the reform date and z as any time after the reform date. Thus, rewrite the solution as c 2 (zjt; k(t)) = k(t) + R T t e r(v t) y 2 (v)dv R T t e r(v t)+(r )v= (v) 1= dv e 
Step 2. Solve the pre-reform (t = 0) subproblem:
Next we solve the t = 0 subproblem as in Theorem 1, The share of the budget crisis resolved through extra taxation is α, and the share resolved through benefit adjustments is 1 − α. The share of the budget crisis resolved through extra taxation is α, and the share resolved through benefit adjustments is 1 − α. 
